Martine Rothblatt’s latest book, Virtually Human, the promise – and the peril – of digital immortality, recommended by none less than the likes of Craig Venter and Ray Kurzweil, is based on an interesting premise, which looks quite reasonable in principle.
Each one of us leaves behind such a large digital trace that it could be used, at least in principle, to teach a machine to behave like the person that generated the trace. In fact, if you put together all the pictures, videos, emails and messages that you generate in a lifetime, together with additional information like GPS coordinates, phone conversations, and social network info, there should be enough information for the right software to learn to behave just like you.
Rothblatt imagines that all this information will be stored in what she calls a mindfile and that such a mindfile could be used by software (mindware) to create mindclones, software systems that would think, behave and act like the original human that was used to create the mindfile. Other systems, similar to these, but not based on a copy of a human original, are called bemans, and raise similar questions. Would such systems have rights and responsibilities, just like humans? Rothblatt argues forcefully that society will have to recognize them as persons, sooner or later. Otherwise, we would assist to a return to situations that modern societies have already abandoned, like slavery, and other practices that disrespect basic human rights (in this case, mindclone and beman’s rights).
Most of the book is dedicated to the analysis of the social, ethical, and economic consequences of an environment where humans live with mindclones and bemans. This analysis is entertaining and comprehensive, ranging from subjects as diverse as the economy, human relations, families, psychology, and even religion. If one assumes the technology to create mindclones will happen, thinking about the consequences of such a technology is interesting and entertaining.
However, the book falls short in that it does not provide any convincing evidence that the technology will come to exist, in any form similar to the one that is assumed so easily by the author. We do not know how to create mindware that could interpret a mindfile and use it to create a conscious, sentient, self-aware system that is indistinguishable, in its behavior, from the original. Nor are we likely to find out soon how such a mindware could be designed. And yet, Rothblatt seems to think that such a technology is just around the corner, maybe just a few decades away. All in all, it sounds more like (poor) science fiction than the shape of things to come.